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This Comment examines the current legal framework governing
Fourth Amendment rights for foreign nationals accused of com-
mitting crimes within the United States. Over the past three
years, federal courts have tried several cases charging foreign
nationals with committing crimes through the use of the Inter-
net; these cases demonstrate a lack of clarity in the standard for
warrant requirements regarding these searches. Utilizing these
cases, this Comment creates a hypothetical case that presents
the issues of Fourth Amendment rights for foreign nationals and
seeks to determine how such a question should be answered. It
advocates the clear application of United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez to remote cross-border searches conducted by law en-
forcement officials against foreign nationals. It concludes by
introducing several suggestions to clarify the standard imple-
mented by Verdugo for non-remote cross-border searches. In
addition, this Comment adds a critical view to the rights that
should be accorded foreign nationals when accused of commit-
ting crimes through the Internet.
INTRODUCTION
To remark on the extraordinary growth of the Internet over the past
decade is to belabor the breathtakingly obvious. Nor does highlighting
the equally obvious concomitant growth in Internet crime win anyone
points for originality. Still, Internet crime, like its low-tech brothers,
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requires investigation. This creates a much less obvious and highly
difficult problem, a problem that results from the complex intersection
among high-tech criminal activity, high-tech investigative tools, and the
United States Constitution.
Unlike most conventional international criminals, cybercriminals
never have to enter the jurisdiction of the victim-state to commit their
crimes. A person can lounge in the comfort of his own home in Vladi-
vostok, Russia, and commit a crime in Newark, New Jersey, all without
braving the rush hour traffic or the occasional blackouts of the East
Coast of the United States, indeed, without ever stepping foot in the
United States. Of course, as it turns out, police in Newark can also inves-
tigate much of this activity without ever needing to brave a Russian
winter. Officials can hack into the cybercriminal's computer just as eas-
ily as the criminal hacks that of his victims. There is an important
difference, however, between the two hackers. Unlike the criminal, the
police are still constrained by the Fourth Amendment' when applying
investigative technologies. Precisely how the Fourth Amendment con-
strains these investigations is far from obvious and, in this day of
increasing technological sophistication on the part of both the police and
criminals, it is important to begin to address this issue.2
This Comment will examine the application of the protections of the
Fourth Amendment to individuals who commit Internet-related crime
while residing outside of the jurisdiction of the United States. The prin-
ciple case addressing this issue is United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.3
Verdugo spawned a particular jurisprudence regarding the Fourth
Amendment rights of foreign nationals, but the application of this juris-
prudence to searches of a foreign national's computer or servers outside
of U.S. territory is not entirely clear.4 Indeed, even its relevance to cases
1. The Fourth Amendment states that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. This Comment will refer to the terms "Internet", "cyberspace", and the "World
Wide Web" interchangeably throughout. Essentially, all three terms have become synony-
mous, although there are subtle differences among the three terms. However, since most of the
academic legal literature on the subject does not make reference to the subtle distinctions
between each term, this Comment will use the same practices as other legal journals.
3. 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that U.S. officials did not have to meet Fourth
Amendment requirements when conducting a search in a foreign country even if the searched
party lacked voluntary connection to the United States). I will refer to this case as "Verdugo"
throughout this Comment.
4. For instance, numerous questions abound about what legally constitutes a remote-
cross border search within the boundaries of the United States. See Patricia L. Bellia, Chasing
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involving cybercrimes committed by foreign nationals is debatable.
Verdugo's facts and holding are easily distinguishable from those cases
where evidence is secured by a remote cross-border search.5
In Part I, I will propose a hypothetical dealing with cross-border
searches against foreign nationals accused of committing Internet-based
crimes with effects in the United States. To focus the problem more
acutely, this hypothetical is constructed by drawing from two recent
cases where foreign nationals were accused of just such criminal activ-
ity: United States v. Ivanov6 and United States v. Zezev.7 Part II will
discuss Verdugo, focusing on the main factors involved in the decision.
In Part III, I will apply Verdugo to the hypothetical suggested in Part I to
determine what Fourth Amendment protections should be provided to
the defendant. This section will also discuss the limitations inherent in
applying the Verdugo holding to our hypothetical case. Finally, Part IV
advocates using Verdugo to analyze these types of remote-cross border
search cases; it also offers clarifying factors for applying the Fourth
Amendment to these searches-factors that are attentive to both the
unique characteristics of the search and the important values embodied
in the Fourth Amendment. This proposed standard derives from the rea-
soning of Verdugo and is consistent with that case's underlying premises;
yet it avoids the risks that arise from an expansive interpretation of the
Verdugo holding. This Comment concludes by encouraging the adoption
of the proposed standard in order to better facilitate the detraction of cy-
bercrime while properly protecting the civil rights of those accused.
I. THE RELEVANT PROBLEM AND CREATING THE HYPOTHETICAL
To be perfectly accurate, the development of the Internet and the re-
sulting opportunities for crime have not created a new problem as much
Bits Across Borders, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 35, 82 n. 152 ("Precisely what the Fourth
Amendment requires when the United States conducts a cross-border search of data physically
located abroad is a complicated question.").
5. Id. ("Verdugo left open the question whether the Fourth Amendment constrains a
foreign search by U.S. officials of an individual who has a substantial connection to the
United States .... ").
6. 175 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 2001) (convicting Ivanov of hacking into the Online
Information Bureau (an e-commerce business) and extorting money from OIB in exchange for
not corrupting its server or business).
7. This case was not reported in Lexis or Westlaw. It was reported on the Department
of Justice's Cybercrime website and by the New York Times. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of
Justice, U.S. Convicts Kazakhstan Hacker of Breaking Into Bloomberg L.P.'s Computers and
Attempting Extortion (Feb. 26, 2003), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/zezevConvict.htm [here-
inafter U.S. Convicts Kazakhstan Hacker]; Michael Cooper, Bloomberg Tells Trial Jury of his
Part in Taped Sting, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 12, 2003, at B4.
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as they have modified and made more difficult an old problem. The
Internet permits someone to sit abroad at his computer and commit a
crime within U.S. jurisdiction, while never entering the physical bounda-
ries of the United States. This phenomenon is not new, of course.
Telephones, telegrams, and facsimile machines have long facilitated
transnational communication, speeding not only commerce, but also
crime. And foreign companies have long been able to violate our anti-
trust laws without ever sending even the lowest level employee to the
United States.8
Logistical complications, however, have generally made it difficult
to gather evidence of these traditional crimes when executed abroad. 9 In
order to search the London gentlemen's club where a conspiracy is
hatched, for example, law enforcement officials would have to travel to
England, get past the doorman, and rifle through the club's files or tap its
phones. Unless the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") could tap all
the phones in Miami, law enforcement personnel would need to fly to
Colombia and tap a drug lord's phone directly. And Federal Trade Com-
mission ("FTC") officials, or their Department of Justice counterparts,
would have to eat sushi for a week in Tokyo while searching the business
records of a Tokyo company that allegedly violates U.S. antitrust laws.
In other words, the U.S. government would have to physically invade an
individual's privacy in a foreign country or least travel to that foreign
country in order to conduct the search.
In the case of Internet crime, however, U.S. law enforcement offi-
cials need not physically enter the territory of another country while they
gather evidence against a foreign suspect.' ° They, like their criminal ad-
versaries, can do much of the work from their own computer terminals in
the United States. The use of computer technology, therefore, creates a
new wrinkle in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the rights of
foreign nationals during law enforcement searches.
8. See U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger
Guidelines (June 14, 1984), reprinted in ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, ANTI-
TRUST 925 Appendix B (1989) ("[Tjhe Guidelines' standards relating to the definition of
markets and calculation of market shares will apply equally to foreign and domestic firms.").
9. For instance, the U.S. government had placed FBI offices abroad in a number of
countries, with 45 Legal Attache offices and four Legat sub-offices. Although allowing for
more interaction with law enforcement abroad, these offices are still generally very small. See
http://www.fbi.gov/contact/legat/legat.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003) (describing the FBI's
Legal Attache Program). Additionally, most local police departments and the Securities and
Exchange Commission have virtually no logistical presence outside of the United States.
10. Bellia, supra note 4, at 77 ("[D]oes the fact that searching officials never enter the
target state's territory [when performing a remote cross-border search] convert the affront to
sovereignty from an intentional performance of sovereign functions on another state's territory
into mere interference with the goals of a regulatory scheme .... ).
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The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to uphold a person's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy from governmental searches and other
intrusions. It originally dealt only with physical searches by law en-
forcement,' but logic quickly compelled its expansion to protect against
any intrusion that violated one's sense of privacy and personal security.'
2
Of course, it was not generally thought that these protections ex-
tended beyond the borders of the United States.' 3 Foreign nationals living
in foreign countries were entitled to privacy to the extent "reasonable" in
that country, not in ours. For instance, individual countries have different
laws recognizing rights of financial privacy from government intrusion.
4
As such, a citizen may only claim a right to privacy to the extent that one
is provided under the laws of that citizen's country. It would not be rea-
sonable for a citizen to claim a heightened right of privacy against
government intrusion if their respective countries did not provide for that
right. But with foreign nationals committing computer crime against the
U.S. government and its citizens in large numbers, and with the U.S.
government now able to conduct remote cross-border searches,' 5 the ap-
plication of Fourth Amendment rights is not as straightforward or simple
as it used to be.
Over the past three years, the U.S. government prosecuted several
cases specifically dealing with foreign nationals committing Internet-
related crimes in the United States. 6 In each of these cases U.S. law
11. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) ("The Amendment itself
shows that the search is to be of material things-the person, the house, his papers or his ef-
fects.").
12. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13. "Nowhere is the Fourth Amendment more effective than within the territorial
boundaries of the United States... it is a well-established principle that the Constitution is of
greatest import within the United States." Victor C. Romero, Whatever Happened to the
Fourth Amendment?: Undocumented Immigrants' Rights After INS v. Lopezmendoza and
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999, 1017 (citing In re Ross, 140 U.S.
453, 464 (1898) (stating that the guarantees of the Constitution "apply only to citizens and
others within the United States") (emphasis added)).
14. Richard Priess, Privacy of Financial Information and Civil Rights Issues: The Im-
plications for Investigating and Prosecuting International Economic Crime, 14 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 525, 528-529 (1996).
15. The government in both United States v. Ivanov and United States v. Gorshkov
utilized remote cross-border searches to gather evidence against the suspects. See Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Russian Computer Hacker Sentenced to Three Years in Prison
(Oct. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Russian Computer Hacker Sentenced], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminalcybercrime/gorshkovSent.htm ("A few days after the two men
[Ivanov and Gorshkov] were arrested, the FBI obtained access via the Internet to two of the
men's computers in Russia. The FBI copied voluminous data from the accounts ... and exam-
ined the data....") (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
16. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Russian Computer Hacker Con-
victed by Jury (Oct. 10, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
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enforcement personnel physically present in the United States searched,
via the Internet, the alleged criminal's computer or server. In the
Gorshkov and Ivanov cases, the courts allowed the evidence gathered
from the search to be presented during trial." Drawing from these cases,
one can construct a hypothetical case that is both realistic and calculated
to introduce the serious Fourth Amendment problems that these cases are
likely to present.
A. Introduction to the Internet and Cybercrime
From its rather modest inception as a device to enhance the ex-
change of scientific information, the Internet has become, without
exaggeration, the "Information Superhighway," linking millions, perhaps
billions of computers together across the World Wide Web.' With these
links, however, came the opportunity for criminals to gain appreciably
wider access to potential victims and, equally important, their financial
information and other resources. Dependency on computers and the net-
works built around those computers "is growing exponentially," and the
"dependency amounts to significant vulnerability ... [because] com-
puter networks underlie key societal functions as diverse as finance,
military command and control, medical treatment, and transportation."' 9
gorshkovconvict.htm (reporting on the conviction in United States v. Gorshkov) (last visited
Nov. 13, 2003); Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Russian Man Sentenced for Hacking
Into Computers in the United States (July 25, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/ivanovSent.htm (reporting on the sentencing in United State v. Ivanov)
(last visited Nov. 13, 2003); Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Kazakhstan Hacker Sen-
tenced to Four Years Prison for Breaking into Bloomberg Systems and Attempting Extortion
(July 1, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/zezevSent.htm (report-
ing on the sentencing in United States v. Zezev) (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
17. United States v. Gorshkov, No. CROO-550C, 2001 WL 1024026 *1, *6 (W.D. Wash.
May 23, 2001) (denying the motion by Gorshkov to suppress the computer data seized by
federal agents from two computers located in Russia); United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d
367, 370 (D. Conn. 200t) ("The defendant and the government agree that when Ivanov alleg-
edly engaged in the conduct charged in the superseding indictment he was physically present
in Russia and using a computer there at all relevant times.").
18. The Internet started as a conglomerate of computers networked together in the
1960s under the auspices of the Advanced Research Projects Agency ("ARPA"), a Department
of Defense Agency and the predecessor of DARPA ("Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency"). Lawrence E. Evans, Jr., Internet Overview, 63 TEx. B.J. 227, 234 (2000). The first
linkages of computers consisted of machines at Stanford, UCLA, UCSB and the University of
Utah. The development of the World Wide Web occurred when scientist Timothy Bemers-Lee
developed the system in order to facilitate communication and information sharing between
scientists working for the European Laboratory for Particle Physics. Rob A. Reilly, Concep-
tual Foundations of Privacy: Looking Backward Before Stepping Forward, 6 RIcH. J. L. &
TECH. 6, 23 (1999). See also Richard D. Harris, Trademark and Copyright Law on the World
Wide Web: A Survey of the Wild Frontier, 588 PLI/PAT 553, 557 (2000).
19. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attacks and the Use of Force in Interna-
tional Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 886
(1999).
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Cases of computer crime and international electronic espionage were
reported as early as 1986, as German hackers "attacked computers oper-
ated by Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory" and "obtained sensitive
information-such as munitions information, information on weapons
systems and technical data-and sold it to the KGB. 20 Subsequently,
because computer systems are attacked, altered, and hacked with great
frequency, the computer savvy of hackers has also increased apace. 2' The
cost of technology has decreased significantly, making highly sophisti-
cated equipment available even to those of modest means. This increased
availability "means greater numbers of cheap, networked computers
[are] available to the criminal elements of society.
' 22
Only man's imagination seems to limit the range of crimes that can
be committed through the Internet. Internet crimes include "fraud, hate
crimes, stalking, gambling ... money laundering," extortion, vandalism,
and espionage, as well as many others.23 It appears, however, the most
frequent crimes are the creation and dissemination of computer viruses
and computer hacking. Accordingly, this Comment will focus on a hy-
pothetical case that arises through the commission of either computer
hacking or the spread of a computer virus.
20. David Goldstone & Betty-Ellen Shave, Essay: International Dimensions of Crimes
in Cyberspace, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1924, 1926-27 (1999). For an in-depth view of the
German hacker case, see CLIFF STOLL, THE CUCKOO'S EGG: TRACKING A SPY THROUGH THE
MAZE OF COMPUTER ESPIONAGE (1989).
21. See Goldstone & Shave, supra note 20, at 1927-30 (examining six of the interna-
tional computer crimes committed by hackers since 1993); see also Computer Intrusion Cases,
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/
cccases.html (last accessed May 23, 2003) (providing a summary chart of recently prosecuted
computer cases as a representative sample, including sixteen of those cases that encompass an
international dimension (out of seventy cases posted)) [hereinafter Computer Intrusion Cases].
22. Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care about Computer Crime, 10 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 465, 467 (1997) (discussing the reasons why domestic law enforcement, particu-
larly the local and state entities, are unable and unwilling to put resources into investigating
and prosecuting cybercrime).
23. Id. at 469. One can split computer crime into three different categories: computer
target crimes, computer tool crimes, and crimes where the computer is merely incident to the
actual crime (such as storing information regarding crimes or writing extortion letters on the
computer). David Carter, Computer Crime Categories: How Techno-Criminals Operate, 64
FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., at 21 (July 1995) (describing these three categories of computer
crimes).
24. D.C. Kennedy, In Search of a Balance Between Police Power and Privacy in the
Cybercrime Treaty, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2002) (discussing Draft 19 of the proposed Cy-
bercrime Treaty drafted by the Council of Europe).
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B. Cybercrime and the Fourth Amendment
1. The Fourth Amendment Generally
For much of its history, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment applied only to physical searches of tangible property.25 In
1967, however, the Court shifted away from a test based solely on physi-
cality and began to define Fourth Amendment protections in terms of an
individual's expectations of privacy.26 Following the logic of Katz, the
Court necessarily expanded Fourth Amendment rights considerably, with
the reasonable expectation of privacy of the individual searched serving
as the centerpiece of its analysis.27 Though commentators have argued
that the targeted individual is in the best position to know whether he or
28she had an expectation of privacy, the Court has generally favored a
more objective (rights-based) standard. Such an objective standard re-
quires that the individual's expectation of privacy be one that society
would be willing to recognize as reasonable (by allowing legally effec-
tive steps to enjoin the invasion of that privacy) and would serve as the
basis for a legal right to enjoin law enforcement from conducting a
search.29
25. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that the use of a
wiretap was not a search of a physical thing and that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit
the conduct of the police because there "was no entry of the houses or offices of the defen-
dants"); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131 (1942) (holding that the use of a
"detectaphone" on the outside of a building did not involve physical trespass and therefore the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to the conduct of the officials using that phone).
26. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that wiretapping by
the government was prohibited without a warrant). "[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-agalnst unreasonable searches and
seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id.
27. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979). Both cases accepted Justice Harlan's construction of the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection in terms of the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.
28. There are a couple of arguments about the expectation of privacy, among them the
statistical-based justification for expectation of privacy and the rights-based (more objective)
standard for expectation of privacy. The statistical-based Fourth Amendment conception draws
on an "argument that an expectation of privacy is constitutionally 'reasonable' merely because
a strong statistical likelihood exists that the information a person seeks to hide from others
will remain private." See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption
Create a "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?", 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 506 (2001). The
rights-based Fourth Amendment conception allows for the reasonable expectation of privacy if
a person has a right to take reasonably effective steps to enjoin the government's invasion of
privacy "such as by obtaining an injunction or physically blocking a government search." Id.
at 507-08. Kerr states that academic literature notes both types of conceptions, but that the
"majority of the Supreme Court has consistently adopted a rights-based approach." Id.
29. Id. at 509-10. These cases include Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding
that agents in helicopters in public airspace did not need a warrant to view into defendant's
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Under the current standard, the government may conduct searches in
a number of circumstances without the express permission of the defen-
dant.30 Additionally, at trial the government may use information that the
targeted individual has shared with a third party.' Current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence requires that "a warrant be obtained for any
domestic criminal search of a home or business, unless there are exigent
circumstances. 32 This latter exception allows a court to admit evidence
as long as there is probable cause for the search and "a warrant cannot be
obtained because of time and emergency." 3  Otherwise, the government
is required to secure a warrant from a magistrate before conducting the
search. 4
2. Computers, Networks, and the Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court has recognized that Fourth Amendment
protections are generally required for physical searches and for searches
conducted using new technologies. 35 Thus, the pivotal issues are the
property), United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (holding that performing a field test
on a legally seized substance did not require an additional warrant), and California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that like Jacobsen, agents in planes in public airspace did not
need a warrant to view into defendant's uncovered property).
30. Searches conducted at the border are deemed reasonable without any examination
of the expectation of privacy. See generally Roberto Iraola, Terrorism, the Border, and the
Fourth Amendment, 2003 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 11.5 (2003) (exploring "the Fourth Amend-
ment's exception for routine searches and seizures occurring at the border"); see also Michael
Mello, Friendly Fire: Privacy vs. Security After September 11, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 367, 376
(2002) ("[Ilf a search occurs pursuant to probable cause and a warrant (or if the facts come
within an exception to either or both of these requirements), then that search will be deemed
'reasonable' and therefore constitutional.").
31. Kerr, supra note 28, at 510-11. These cases include United States v. Hoffa, 385
U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that informant disclosures from a third party did not violate the
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (holding that consent by
another party living in the same house to search the premises was not a violation of the defen-
dant's Fourth Amendment rights). But see United States v. Sledge, 650 F.2d 1075, 1077-78
n.4 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that information
revealed to a third party and disclosed to the government did not result in Fourth Amendment
violations to the defendant).
32. Ruth Wedgewood, Decision: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 747,
747 (1990) (citing to decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, specifically Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499 (1978) and McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) and discussing the Ver-
dugo case as a recent development of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the applicability of
constitutional restraints to U.S. officials acting abroad).
33. Id. at 747-48.
34. C. Ryan Reetz, Warrant Requirements for Searches of Computerized Information,
67 B.U. L. REV. 179, 184 (1987) ("The warrant requirement is an essential component of
Fourth Amendment protection because it prevents the police from conducting searches at
will.").
35. Alyson L. Rosenberg, Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging: A New Weapon in the
Fight Against Crime or a Fourth Amendment Violation, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 135, 141
(1998) ("In order to keep pace with ... technological advancements in law enforcement
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nature of the technology involved in conducting the search, how the
search is conducted, what degree of intrusion is allowable, and what
expectations of privacy are reasonable.
In order to more fully understand the conditions and limitations of
constitutional searches with respect to the Internet, it is necessary to un-
derstand the fundamentals of Internet functionality and data storage on
computers. All data is stored in binary form somewhere on some com-
puter. In this sense, there is a physical depository of data. In our
hypothetical, we will posit that the binary data and relevant codes are
physically stored in a computer located in a foreign country.36
But one might argue that such data is also part of the mystical net-
work of the Internet and, in that sense, it is stored everywhere, not
necessarily just on the computer server in the United States or in a for-
eign country. 7 Thus, in addition to a physical search of an actual
computer, law enforcement officials can also search the network used to
commit the crime or search through the network into another server to
which another computer is connected and upon which the desired data is
stored.
One might argue that by extrapolating current Fourth Amendment
doctrine it should apply to searches of these networks as well. Katz, for
example, holds that Fourth Amendment protections are not solely limited
to the physical search of physical locations.38 Katz might extend to
searches that are conducted through the use of technology that garners
information, but which do not physically intrude into the target's home,
office or other space. It is therefore important to define the precise nature
and form of a search of the Internet or a computer network.
One view is that searches via the Internet or searches of networks do
not require investigators to search any physical space and thus are not
surveillance, courts are forced to reconsider the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. In
determining whether technology used by law enforcement officials constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search, courts rely on the two-part test articulated by Justice Harlan... ").
36. Of course, we are not concerned about data that is physically stored in binary form
on a computer located in the United States because with a physical search of a computer on
which the police can actually get their hands, warrants are required just like in most other
physical searches. See generally Reetz, supra note 34 (discussing Fourth Amendment re-
quirements for searching computer records generally, and specifically mentioning the use of
telephone access and warrant requirements for that access).
37. One court has stated that the "Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather
a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer net-
works." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996). This means that it is a
"network of networks." See Jennifer Hamilton, Recent Development: Playboy Enterprises v.
Chuckleberry Publishing, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 521, 521 (1997) (citing ACLU v. Reno).
This "network of networks" can virtually exist everywhere, thereby allowing data to be stored
along the network without actually residing in one area.
38. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
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"searches" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The opposite
view is that a physical search does occur because the data and informa-
tion, whether in a physical computer, a server network, or the Internet,
still exists physically within a computer hard drive or server. This type of
search is one step removed from tangible searches of a physical location;
one might argue that such a search would be entitled to consideration
under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Additionally, new technologies
within computers, such as encryption devices for computer messages
and files, raise the distinct possibility that wherever the data is actually
stored, the owners of the data have expectations regarding privacy that
might be deemed reasonable by the courts.
C. Constructing the Hypothetical
1. Recent Cases Involving
International Cybercriminals and the Fourth Amendment
Two relatively recent cases offer an intriguing perspective on the
treatment of foreign nationals relating to crimes committed through the
use of computers and the Internet. In the most recent, a Russian national
illegally gained access to a financial services website and then attempted
to extort money by threatening to reveal his ability to gain access to all
the financial services company's information.39 Oleg Zezev successfully
gained access to the server that contained all the Bloomberg Financial
L.P. intranet information and developed a capacity to control all levels of
information on the company's site.4° This latter kind of access is called
"root access.,4' After gaining access, Zezev sent messages under the
name "Alex," stating that unless he received $200,000, he would reveal
to the media his ability to gain complete and unfettered access to, and
control of, the Bloomberg computer system.42 By arranging a meeting in
London between Zezev and Michael Bloomberg himself, U.S. officials
39. United States v. Zezev was decided on February 26, 2003, but has not yet been
reported into either Lexis or Westlaw. The facts of the case and summary can be found on the
Internet in the Department of Justice Cybercrime website. See U.S. Convicts Kazakhstan
Hacker, supra note 7.
40. Id. Zezev gained access to legitimate employee and customer accounts, including
Michael Bloomberg's personal account, copying internal emails, information, and
Bloomberg's personal credit card numbers.
41. "Root access is a descriptive term meaning that the user is recognized as a system
administrator and consequently obtains the authority to change passwords or destroy data-
authority that normal users do not have." Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Re-
evaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 925 (2003).
42. U.S. Convicts Kazakhstan Hacker, supra note 7. After concluding that the claims by
"Alex" were correct, Bloomberg computer specialists fixed the computer server code so that
he would not be able to subsequently access Bloomberg computers.
Boundaries of Fourth Amendment Rights
arrested Zezev and an accomplice and extradited them to the United
States to stand trial. Zezev was subsequently convicted of several com-
puter crimes. 4' According to the facts of this case, Zezev gained access
by routing his hacking through a number of different countries into a
computer server in the United States." Despite his intentions to access
information in the United States, at no time did Zezev enter the United
States or otherwise subject himself to personal jurisdiction based on his
location.45
United States v. Ivanov raises similar questions about what Fourth
Amendment protections should be accorded to foreign nationals outside
the United States.46 Ivanov, along with an accomplice (Gorshkov from
United States v. Gorshkov),47 illegally gained accessed to a number of
online service providers and e-commerce businesses, obtaining
passwords and server access to these websites and computer systems. 8
Once they obtained these codes and passwords, Ivanov and Gorshkov
threatened to destroy merchant computer systems and account databases
unless they received a $10,000 payment to make each computer system
secure.49 In order to apprehend them, the FBI constructed a computer
security firm called "Invita" and invited Ivanov and Gorshkov to travel to
the United States to showcase their skills.50 In the job interview, they
were encouraged to show how they could illegally gain access to an
43. Id.
44. Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Three Kazak Men Arrested in London for
Hacking into Bloomberg L.P.'s Computer System (Aug. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/bloomberg.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
45. Id.
46. 175 E Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 2001). This is the primary published case against
Aleksey Vladimirovich Ivanov. There are three additional cases against Ivanov based in the
Western District of Washington, the Central District of California, and the Eastern District of
California. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Russian Computer Hacker Indicted in
California for Breaking Into Computer Systems and Extorting Victim Companies (June 20,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ivanovlndict2.htm ("In addition
to the charges brought today in California, Ivanov faces computer intrusion and fraud charges
in Seattle and Connecticut.") (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
47. Russian Computer Hacker Sentenced, supra note 15 (discussing Gorshkov's sen-
tence for computer intrusion charges); see also United States v. Gorshkov, No. CROO-550C,
2001 WL 1024026 *1 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001) (deciding that the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to remote-cross border searches because the Russian defendant did not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy and because the computer searched was physically in Russia).
Judge Coughernour essentially glossed over the issues regarding a remote-cross border search
and did not consider the Verdugo factors in deciding this order. Id. at *3-4.
48. Ivanov, at 369.
49. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Russian National
Indicted on Computer Intrusion Charges (Aug. 16, 2001), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/
ivanovlndict3.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Russian National Indicted].
50. Russian National Indicted, supra note 49.
Fall 20031
152 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 10:139
FBI-created website.5' With FBI agents watching, the hackers worked.
What Ivanov and Gorshkov did not know, however, was that a special,
FBI-installed keystroke program recorded the information the hackers
put into the computer. The Russians accessed their own server networks
in Russia in order to access the FBI-created website.52 Once the "job
interview" ended, agents arrested Ivanov and Gorshkov and indicted
them on charges of computer intrusion. Subsequently, the government
used the information gathered during the "Invita job interview" to access
the Russian hackers' own servers and files in Russia for evidence to be
used in their trials. With the data that the FBI provided during their
trials, both Ivanov and Gorshkov were found guilty of computer
intrusion and other crimes associated with that intrusion.55
2. Creating the Hypothetical
Taking these cases as a base, one can easily imagine a hypothetical
that raises important and difficult questions about the application of the
Fourth Amendment to searches conducted against foreign nationals who
reside on foreign soil. Imagine a scenario in which Russian nationals,
located in Minsk, gain illegal access to company computer servers along
the Dulles Technology Corridor in Northern Virginia. These foreign na-
tionals access a number of important documents and bank accounts
within each company. In some manner, the FBI is able to take custody of
these alleged criminals when they come to visit a friend in Portland,
Maine. The FBI, while stationed at computers physically located in the
United States, gains access to the Russians' own servers physically lo-
cated within Russia, locating a number of documents and programs used
51. Ariana Enjung Cha, A Tempting Offer for Russian Pair; The Bait: Chance for Jobs
in U.S., WASH. POST, May 19, 2003, at Al. ("To catch Ivanov, U.S. authorities couldn't very
well go to Russia and grab him so they had to figure out a way to get him here... the FBI was
working behind the scenes to try to get the hackers to a place where they could be arrested.").
52. Id. ("[T]he hackers were asked to prove their skills. The FBI secretly videotaped the
encounter.").
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000) (Fraud and related activity in connection with computers).
54. Russian Computer Hacker Sentenced, supra note 15. "A few days after the two men
[lvanov and Gorshkov] were arrested the FBI obtained access via the Internet to two of the
men's computers in Russia. The FBI copied voluminous data from the accounts ... and exam-
ined the data pursuant to a search warrant issued ... " Id.
55. Although found guilty, Gorshkov tried to bring a motion to suppress the evidence
seized through a remote-cross border search from his computer located in Russia. This motion
to suppress the seized data was struck down by Judge Coughenour, stating, "The Fourth
Amendment does not apply to the agent's extraterritorial access to computers in Russia and
their copying of data contained thereon." United States v. Gorshkov, No. CROO-550C, 2001
WL 1024026 *1, *3 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001). The Judge continues, "Until the copied data
was transmitted to the United States, it was outside the territory of this country and not subject
to the protections of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
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to break into the technology companies. All of this is carried out by the
federal government without a warrant and without the assistance or
knowledge of the Russian government, which presumably has physical
jurisdiction over the Russians' computer servers.
To answer fully the Fourth Amendment questions raised by this hy-
pothetical, we must start with the principal case allowing the federal
government to search extraterritorially a foreign national's location
without securing either permission or a warrant under the Fourth
Amendment protections.
II. UNITED STATES V. VERDUGO- URQUIDEZ AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A STANDARD
A. The Facts of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court faced a monumental deci-
sion regarding the rights of foreign nationals accused of crimes
committed in the United States. The Drug Enforcement Agency
("DEA") believed Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez to be "one of the
leaders of a large and violent organization in Mexico that smuggles Nar-
cotics into the United States. '5 6 Mexican police officers, with U.S.
Marshals standing by, arrested Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico and trans-
ported him to the United States. Federal officials then arranged to have
him tried in federal court in San Diego.57 After his arrival in the United
States, DEA agents began searching the premises of Verdugo-Urquidez's
residences in Mexico to obtain evidence for his trial.58 These DEA agents
worked in concert with Mexican police authorities, along with the ex-
press permission of DEA authorities based in Mexico, to obtain evidence
of drug smuggling and other activities that would be used against
Verdugo-Urquidez. 59 Relying on Reid v. Covert,60 the U.S. District Court
concluded that the Fourth Amendment "applied to the DEA search be-
cause it was a joint venture of the American and Mexican police
officers.",6' A divided panel for the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit




60. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that U.S. citizens tried by the United States military
authorities in a foreign country were entitled to the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments). It concluded that "[t]he Constitution imposes substantive constraints on the federal
government, even when it operates abroad." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d
1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1988).
61. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1217.
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affirmed the District Court's holding.62 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
the Government's petition for certiorari.63
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection afforded to foreign nationals when their property abroad was
searched by instrumentalities of the U.S. Government. Offering numer-
ous rationales, most prominently the Court's disinclination to hinder the
Executive Branch's foreign activities, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to aliens without any "voluntary attachment to
the United States" when the search was conducted outside the physical
borders of U.S. territory.'
The Court emphasized the fact that the search took place outside of
the United States. Normally, any resident alien that has property
searched within the borders of the United States is accorded the same
constitutional protections as a U.S. citizen." Rather than extending these
same rights to foreign nationals and their property lying outside of the
United States, however, the Supreme Court held that the warrant re-
quirement does not extend to government authorities conducting
searches of property held by foreign nationals outside of U.S. jurisdic-
tion. Despite the lack of Fourth Amendment protections to a foreign
national in an extraterritorial search by the federal government, the Court
indicated that the defendant would still receive his Fifth Amendment due
process rights and that this might offset, to some extent, any disadvan-
tage the defendant might suffer from the loss of Fourth Amendment
protections.66 This holding altered the landscape for protections of for-
eign defendants and significantly liberated criminal investigators
operating abroad on behalf of the U.S. government.
B. The Main Factors of the Verdugo Holding
The Verdugo Court emphasized four factors as most relevant to its
decision. First, the Court recognized that Verdugo-Urquidez was a for-
eign national and was in United States custody during the search, but
that the search occurred outside of the sovereign territory of the United
62. Id.
63. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 490 U.S. 1063 (1989).
64. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 274-75. The Court concluded that "[i]f there are to be restric-
tions on searches and seizure which occur incident to such American action, they must be
imposed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty or legislation." Id.
65. See e.g., Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1982) (holding that illegal aliens are
protected under the Equal Protection Clause); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596
(1953) (holding that a resident alien is a "person" for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment).
66. "All [of the Justices] would agree, for instance, that the dictates of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant." 494 U.S. at 278. (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
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States.67 Second, DEA agents conducted the search with Mexican au-
thorities present.6 Third, Verdugo-Urquidez "had no previous significant
voluntary connection with the United States" and therefore could not
avail himself of the constitutional protections available to other aliens.69
Finally, since the searches occurred abroad, the foreign affairs power of
the Executive Branch was implicated, thus raising the possibility that the
opposite decision could hinder the political decisions and the activities
of other, co-equal branches of government.0
1. Government Action Takes Place Outside of the United States
First among the factors highlighted by the Court was the location of
the search. The search by the federal government took place outside of
U.S. territory. To distinguish this search from those conducted inside the
United States, the Court relied upon Johnson v. Eisentrager,7' which re-
jected the ability of aliens outside of the sovereign territory of the United
States to claim Fifth Amendment rights.7' Thus, even though the Verdugo
defendant was in U.S. custody when the search occurred, the physical
search itself took place outside of the sovereign territory of the United
States. Utilizing a historical argument, the Court stated "that the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United States
against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggested
that the provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal
Government against aliens outside of the United States territory.
' 73
The same result can be expected from a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" standpoint, although the analysis will differ slightly. A foreign
national in another country would only be able to expect the same pro-
tections that his country would provide to him or her.74 Therefore, the
67. Id. at 262.
68. Id. ("DEA agents working in concert with officers of the MFJP [Mexican Federal
Judicial Police] searched respondent's properties in Mexicali and San Felipe and seized cer-
tain documents.").
69. Id. at 271.
70. Id. at 273 ("[T]he result of accepting [Verdugo-Urquidez's] claim would have sig-
nificant and deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting activities beyond its
boundaries.").
71. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
72. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 269. Since the defendant was within the custody of the United
States, the Court stated that he was not to be denied his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.
The Court stated, however, that if the Fifth Amendment (which uses the term "person") is not
to be due to aliens outside the United States, then "it would seem even truer with respect to the
Fourth Amendment, which applies only to 'the people.'" Id.
73. Id. at 266.
74. Indeed, it would be odd for a foreign national to expect privacy protections ac-
corded to U.S. citizens in his or her own country if that country does not provide the same
privacy protections in its own country that U.S. courts provide to its own citizens.
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Verdugo holding's first standard is that the U.S. government must be
searching the property of a foreign national located outside of the sover-
eign territory of the United States.
2. Foreign Government Involvement in the Search
The Court also specifically notes that Mexican police authorities as-
sisted the search of Verdugo-Urquidez's residence. Although the Court
does not elaborate, measured reasoning supports the relevance of this
factor: A foreign national's expectations of privacy are defined by those
protections that his own government affords. If officials from his gov-
ernment are present and approve the search, then the foreign national's
reasonable expectations have been considered. In other words, the pres-
ence of the Mexican police gave the Court some comfort that the DEA
agents were conducting a search in conformity with Mexican law, which,
after all, is the most a Mexican citizen residing in Mexico can expect.
In addition, excluding evidence legally gathered in Mexico because
the processes of gathering that evidence are illegal in the United States
potentially implicates foreign affairs. The Court rightly points out that
"we live in a world of nation-states in which our Government must be
able to 'function effectively in the company of sovereign nations.' ,7 To
overturn a search that was valid in Mexico because it might not be valid
in the United States would seriously undermine the notion of nation-state
sovereignty. The Court dislikes condoning any federal government activ-
ity that might violate the sovereignty of other nations, even within the
context of law enforcement searches or seizures.76 Thus, a relevant factor
of any subsequent case applying the Verdugo standard is whether the
foreign government either facilitated or assisted with the search that oc-
curs outside of U.S. territory.
3. Substantial and Voluntary Connections with the United States
The third point raised by the Verdugo Court centered on Verdugo-
Urquidez's absence of any substantial connections with the United
States. The Court specifically states that "[Verdugo-Urquidez] is an alien
who has had no previous significant voluntary connection with the
United States ... . ,71 Verdugo-Urquidez tried to rely upon alien's rights
cases in arguing that foreign nationals are able to claim Fourth Amend-
75. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 275 (citation omitted).
76. Indeed, this appeared to be one of the concerns of the Court when it decided United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
77. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 266.
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ment protections." The Court distinguished those cases by asserting that
a foreign national claiming Fourth Amendment rights must have substan-
tial connections with the United States. 9 Even the presence of Verdugo-
Urquidez in the United States at the time of the search did not establish a
voluntary connection with the United States. 80 The Court stated that a
foreign national must possess voluntary connections with the United
States in order to receive the same expectations of Fourth Amendment
rights enjoyed by U.S. citizens and resident aliens.8 '
The Court did not indicate what significant and voluntary connec-
tions would suffice for foreign nationals to claim the desired Fourth
Amendment rights.82 Therefore, subsequent defendants may make myr-
iad arguments to claim such connections.83
4. Concerns About the Court Hindering Other
Foreign Activities of the Executive Branch
In addition to its concerns about the foreign policy power of the
Executive Branch, as well as matters of interstate comity, the Court also
notes that the provision of Fourth Amendment protections in this case
might hinder other non-law enforcement foreign policy activities of the
Executive Branch. The Court notes that "[t]he rule adopted by the Court
of Appeals would apply not only to law enforcement operations abroad,
but also to other foreign policy operations which might result in
'searches and seizures.' "8 The Court recognized that the United States
frequently employs armed forces on foreign soil and a holding that
78. Id. at 270-71. Verdugo-Urquidez cited such cases as Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982) (according illegal aliens Equal Protection Clause rights), Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 229 (1896) (holding that resident aliens enjoyed Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights)
and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that resident aliens also enjoyed the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment) to bolster his claim that foreign nationals enjoyed
the same constitutional protections as citizens, resident aliens, and illegal aliens.
79. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 273.
80. "[T]his sort of presence [of Verdugo-Urquidez in the U.S.]-lawful but involun-
tary-is not of the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country ....
[Riespondent had no voluntary connection with this country that might place him among 'the
people' of the United States." Id. at 271-73.
81. Id. at 274-75. ("At the time of the search, [Verdugo] was a citizen and resident of
Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States, and the place searched was located
in Mexico .... [T]he Fourth Amendment has no application.") (emphasis added).
82. Wedgewood, supra note 32, at 750. "An alien brought to the United States under
arrest has a 'legal but involuntary presence' in the United States and should not be considered
as having a sufficient connection to enjoy Fourth Amendment protections against an extraterri-
torial search/" Id.
83. See infra Part III, evaluating whether a cybercriminal might be able to create such a
reasonable expectation through his actions.
84. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 273.
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requires the federal government to always protect Fourth Amendment
rights of foreign nationals would unnecessarily and inappropriately
hamper those activities.5 Succinctly put, the "[a]pplication of the Fourth
Amendment to those circumstances could significantly disrupt the ability
of the political branches to respond to foreign situations involving our
national interest."" The Court recognized that it would not be in the best
interests of the nation to unduly restrict the ability of the Executive
Branch to respond appropriately to geopolitical demands. 7 To put the
matter in balance of power terms, in "[s]ituations threatening to
important American interests,'88 it is not appropriate for the courts to
impose upon the Executive Branch the same kinds of constitutional
constraints that are mandated when the Executive Branch takes action in
the domestic sphere. Rather, the Court opined, restrictions on searches
and seizures abroad "must be imposed by the political branches through
diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation.' '89
III. APPLYING THE VERDUGO STANDARD TO THE HYPOTHETICAL
In analyzing our hypothetical (based on United States v. Ivanov,
United States v. Zezev and United States v. Gorshkov) in light of the Ver-
dugo holding, we must start where the Court left off, determining the
relevance of the intrusion by the U.S. government on the sovereignty of
the foreign country when it conducts Internet and computer searches. We
will then examine our hypothetical relative to each of the four Verdugo
factors discussed in Part II, supra. In conclusion, we will see that the
Verdugo standard can and should be used to determine the Fourth
Amendment rights for a defendant in our hypothetical remote cross-
85. Id. at 275 ("Situations threatening to important American interests may arise half-
way around the globe, situations which in the view of the political branches of our
Government require an American response with armed force. If there are to be restrictions on
searches and seizures which occur incident to such American action, they must be imposed by
the political branches ....").
86. Id. at 273-74. The Court went on to examine how actions by the federal govern-
ment in a number of different situations involving aliens abroad would result in "a sea of
uncertainty" and that "aliens with no attachment to this country might well bring actions for
damages to remedy claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in
international waters." Id.
87. Id. at 273-74 ("Application of the Fourth Amendment to those circumstances [of
employing armed forces abroad] could significantly disrupt the ability of the political
branches to respond to foreign situations involving our national interest."); see also Wedge-
wood, supra note 32, at 750 ("To require a search warrant for an extraterritorial search would
have a harmful effect on U.S. operations abroad, including use of armed forces.").
88. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 275.
89. Id.
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border search. However, in every case regarding a cross-border search,
each factor of the Verdugo standard should be carefully analyzed, rather
than merely glossing over certain factors.9° Concurrently, it is clear that
future courts must clarify and embellish the Verdugo standard in order to
provide clear guidance to law enforcement officials when they deal with
cybercrime and remote cross-border searches.
A. Foreign Sovereignty and Computer Network Searches
One critical question regarding remote cross-border searches af-
forded only passing attention in Verdugo is whether these searches
violate a country's sovereignty. Several scholars argue that the Internet is
immune from territorial regulation, that it is oblivious to geographical
constraints, and should be treated as a different space. 9' Those who main-
tain this view support the legitimacy of Internet cross-border searches,
arguing that "technological change alters the extraterritorial influence of
purely territorial action [s]"92 and that "remote cross-border searches fit
into the long-accepted practice of officials in one nation acting within
their territory (or from public spaces) to extract information from an-
other."93
The diverging view is the argument that "territorial regulation of the
Internet is no less feasible and no less legitimate than territorial regula-
tion of non-Internet transactions." 94 But even those who believe
90. See United States v. Gorshkov, No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 1024026 * 1, *3-4 (W.D.
Wash. May 23, 2001); see also supra note 55. In Gorshkov, Judge Coughenour only stated
that since the data was outside physical jurisdiction of the United States the Fourth Amend-
ment did not apply. Gorshkov, at *3-4. However, when the defendant brought up the fact that
Verdugo consisted of a search made by a joint effort with the knowledge of Mexican officials
(one of the Verdugo factors stated above in Part II.B.2), the Judge merely dismissed this argu-
ment, stating: "Nothing in the [Verdugo] opinion, however, indicates that the reach of the
Fourth Amendment turns on this issue. Therefore, the search of the Russian computers was
not protected by the Fourth Amendment." Id.
91. See, e.g., David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Conti-
nent": Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1087 (1998) (arguing that the Internet calls for a higher degree of
deference to rulemaking within non-geographical and decentralized associations, and that
there is efficiency in self-regulation of the Internet space, rather than reliance on governmental
associations); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (stating that the creation of the Internet has
"undermin[edl the feasibility-and legitimacy-of laws based on geographic boundaries").
92. Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border
Searches, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 111 (2001).
93. Id. at 115. Goldsmith ultimately concludes, "the early uses of unilateral extraterrito-
rial enforcement measures should not be viewed as an illegitimate invasion of another nation's
sovereignty." Id. at 118.
94. Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sover-
eignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 475 (1998). "Territorial regulation of the Internet
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individual nation-states may regulate the Internet, at least within their
territory, possess differing views on the implications of this regulation on
foreign countries' searches for information. There is also the position
that this type of search is merely an extension of information gathering,
akin to what the United States and other countries have done to each
other and in each other's territory for a number of years.9 But, since it is
possible to view a search as an intrusion into that country's sovereign
territory-the likely view of the targeted country-nations will ulti-
mately have natural incentives to "limit their searches to exigent
circumstances, and to work out cooperative principles where possible"
because of the extent to which aggressive searches could be recipro-
cated.96
Still, "there are strong arguments that the customary international
law prohibit[s] ... law enforcement functions in the territory of another
sovereign.. . even when law enforcement officials do not enter the terri-
tory of another state, 97 such as entering through remote Internet
searches. According to this theory, such searches violate territorial integ-
rity and, whatever the constitutional constraints that exist within the
searching country, such searches are prohibited as violations of interna-
tional law.98
Consequently, at the very outset, a foundational question surround-
ing unilateral cross border searches will be "whether remote cross-
border searches conducted without the consent of the searched state vio-
late the customary international law norm prohibiting law enforcement
officials from performing their functions in the territory of another state
without that state's consent." 99 This question cannot be answered by an
individual country on a unilateral basis. Rather, it requires a cooperative,
agreed-upon answer. To that end, several multilateral organizations have
proposed an International Cybercrime Treaty that would address pre-
cisely this concern.10o
transactions does not in fact lead to simultaneous universal regulation of the Internet... [and]
the Internet is no more likely to undermine national sovereignty than did the telephone or
satellite or television." Id. at 484, 491.
95. Goldsmith, supra note 92, at 114.
96. Id. at 117.
97. Bellia, supra note 4, at 100. Bellia also notes that "[tihis is not to say that all unilat-
eral cross-border searches will violate international law; in some circumstances, it may not be
possible for a state to know that the data it is searching is located beyond its borders." Id. (em-
phasis added).
98. Id. at 101 ("Customary international law and domestic law impose valid legal ob-
stacles on foreign cross-border searches..').
99. Id. at 61-62. Bellia ultimately concludes that unilateral cross-border searches gen-
erally will violate customary international law. Id. at 100.
100. There are numerous articles and notes concerning the creation of an International
Cybercrime Treaty, all discussing the Council of Europe's proposed Cybercrime Convention.
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More to the point, for purposes of current judicial analysis, these
competing views are largely irreconcilable and irresolvable. It is highly
unlikely that a U.S. court would give an expansive reading to the Fourth
Amendment or sharply limit the law enforcement-or foreign policy-
powers of the Executive Branch on the basis of an ill-defined and still
evolving standard of customary international law. Indeed, when com-
mentators and nations themselves do not yet agree on this issue, it is
clear that, by definition, customary international law does not exist. Ac-
cordingly, though the issue of sovereignty looms large over these
searches, it is certain that U.S. courts will utilize Verdugo, and not cus-
tomary international law, to resolve the issue. This Comment will do the
same.
B. Government Action Takes Place Outside the United States
In our hypothetical, the defendant is a foreign national currently be-
ing held in custody by the U.S. government; this fact mirrors Verdugo.
The defendant's status will not be analyzed as a U.S. citizen or a resident
alien. Once these relevant factors are satisfied, one must then analyze the
location of the search to decide whether Verdugo should apply.
The hypothetical created earlier imagines a scenario in which Rus-
sian nationals, located in Minsk, gain illegal access to company
computer servers along the Dulles Technology Corridor in Northern Vir-
ginia. Through the Internet, these foreign nationals access a number of
important documents and bank accounts within each company. The FBI
is able to take custody of these alleged criminals when they come to visit
their friend in Portland, Maine, and then while physically stationed at
FBI computers in the United States, gain access to the Russians' own
servers physically located within Russia. Through this remote cross-
border search, the FBI locates numerous documents and programs used
to break into the technology companies in the United States.
Much like the facts of Verdugo, one can plausibly argue that the
search conducted by the U.S. government does not take place within
U.S. territory. Searching a computer server located within Russia
(whether or not a violation of the sovereignty of that country)' °' should
See, e.g., Albert I. Aldesco, The Demise of Anonymity: A Constitutional Challenge to the Con-
vention on Cybercrime, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 81 (2002); Ryan M. F. Baron, A Critique of
the International Cybercrime Treaty, 10 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 263 (2002); Jay Fischer, The
Draft Convention on Cybercrime: Potential Constitutional Conflicts, 32 U. WEST. L.A. L.
REV. 339 (2001); John T. Soma et al., Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes: Are
New Treaties and Laws Needed?, 34 HARV. J. LEGIs. 317 (1997); Shannon C. Sprinkel, Global
Internet Regulation: The Residual Effects of the "ILoveYou" Computer Virus and the Draft
Convention on Cyber-crime, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 491 (2002).
101. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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be considered an actual search outside the borders of the United States
because the physical server location is in another sovereign territory. The
physical act of gaining access to the computer server might take one
through U.S. territory via the Internet, but the data that is retrieved and
the information that is finally secured is actually searched and
downloaded from a computer physically located in Russia. In Verdugo,
"the place searched was located in Mexico."''0 2 In our instant hypotheti-
cal, the computer server actually searched was located in a foreign
country. Thus, for purposes of Verdugo analysis, the place searched was
in Russia.
Of course, one should recognize that the argument is not quite as
simple as the preceding paragraph suggests. One might claim that the
search is conducted in the United States because it is conducted through
an Internet portal physically present in U.S. territory. FBI agents are sit-
ting at a computer terminal in Kansas, not Minsk. They access the
Russian defendant's computer files and download all his data without
ever leaving the climes of Topeka. In Verdugo, DEA officials were actu-
ally physically present in Mexico to search through relevant documents
and evidence. But, the FBI agents in our hypothetical are never physi-
cally present in Russia, searching the defendant's computer server.103
Therefore, although the target computer server is located in Russia, one
might argue that Verdugo should not apply because the search is taking
place within the territory of the United States.
Resolution of this issue is difficult and likely the most uncertain part
of the analysis. The development of the Internet is still relatively recent,
and legal definitions often lag behind technological developments by a
considerable distance.)°" One might even take these arguments to their
ultimate conclusion, claiming that since the Internet is ultimately con-
nected to numerous networks (and connected to networks within the
jurisdiction of the United States) anything connected with that Internet is
actually in the "territory" of the United States. This would be an argu-
102. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990).
103. One could also counter this argument by stating that the official is in fact "present"
within the computer server when it is accessed. The metaphysics of these arguments would
most likely become a difficult topic to contain, and these issues are not relevant to the overall
topic I am currently discussing.
104. See Reetz, supra note 34, at 182-86 (examining the development of warrant re-
quirements based on relevant technological advances); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The
Internet as Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role in Strengthening National
and Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 423, 426 (1998) ("Perhaps the most
distinguishing feature of the Internet that makes it more threatening to sovereignty is that it is
not susceptible to the same physical and regulatory controls as telegraph, telephone, radio, and
television technologies.").
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ment that the Internet is merely a "network of networks" and that those
continuous networks are merely extensions of another network (and so
on).05 Because the Internet originated in the sovereign territory of the
United States, then anything connected to the Internet would technically
be within the confines of the United States.
One might take an even more extreme view and argue that because
"[c]yberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally sig-
nificant (online) phenomena and physical location,'"'06 concepts of
physicality and location are no longer even relevant to considerations of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and all remote cross-border searches
are actually not even remote, or are, at least, within U.S. jurisdiction.'°7
However, these arguments seem to prove too much. In the first place,
this "network of networks" concept might actually cut against the claim
that Internet cyberspace is within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Each network, after all, is a separate entity and located within its own
territorial confines. In fact, under this argument, only a very small part of
the Internet might be deemed to be within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.
At the other extreme, if the Internet has no location, then it is sus-
ceptible to regulation by anyone and everyone! Indeed, in October 2000,
Minnesota announced that it would regulate all Internet transactions and
uses within its jurisdiction, thereby attempting to protect Minnesota citi-
zens that encounter activities, such as fraud and illegal gambling, on the
Internet.' 8 When physical location loses its relevance as a legal concept,
then regulations are often justified under an effects-based test, premised
on the notion that states have jurisdiction over all activities that create an
effect on its citizens and territory.'9 Under this theory, not only can every
U.S. state and nation-state regulate almost every computer based activity,
but conversely, every citizen of every U.S. state and of any nation-state
can claim the same protections that are afforded in every other state. In
105. Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 80 (1996) ("The crucial point is that the Internet, although globally
accessible, is not a single network: it is a network of networks.").
106. Johnson & Post, supra note 91, at 1370.
107. Id.
108. Note, A Proposal for Removing Road Blocks from the Information Superhighway
By Using an Integrated International Approach to Internet Jurisdiction, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 373, 383 n.80-81 (2001) (citing the Minnesota Attorney General website which stated,
"Persons outside of Minnesota who transmit information via the Internet knowing that infor-
mation will be disseminated in Minnesota are subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota courts for
violations of state and criminal laws").
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 421(2)(i) (1987). Although
the "effects-based" doctrine of jurisdiction is relatively limited, Minnesota applied it in order
to claim the ability to regulate Internet fraud and other transactions.
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short, all the reasoning of the Court in Verdugo goes out the window. No
longer are we concerned about hampering the law enforcement or other
foreign policy activities of the Executive Branch. No longer are we con-
cerned about reasonable expectations of privacy. Every expectation, if
reasonable anywhere in the world, is reasonable under this theory. And
every restriction on the activities of an executive branch, any executive
branch located anywhere in the world, is a valid restriction for courts to
impose on the Executive Branch of the U.S. federal government.
In sum, in the absence of legislation or treaty, the better argument is
that a remote cross-border search undertaken through the Internet is not
within the territory of the United States because the end result of the
search is to secure data and information located in Russia. This argument
is not free from doubt, and certainly is not likely to be free from crit-
ics.1 0 But, it seems reasonable to follow Verdugo's lead and give weight
to the physical location of the computer searched, which, in our case,
would be in Russia.
C. Foreign Government Involvement in the Search
In a remote cross-border search, the federal government might or
might not have the explicit or even tacit approval of the sovereign gov-
ernment of the territory where the target computer server is located. In
the Ivanov case, the Department of Justice "sent a letter through diplo-
matic channels asking that Ivanov be detained and questioned" but there
was no response to this formal request."' Additionally, no diplomatic
request is mentioned in Gorshkov, as the entire search was conducted
"by FBI fiat" without any approval or notification of the Russian gov-
ernment.' 2 For remote cross-border searches, however, it appears that the
Verdugo standard demands some approval from the foreign state.
As far as government approval is concerned, one might read the
Verdugo case as requiring only that the government of the country in
which the information is located be notified prior to the search, rather
than requiring explicit or even tacit approval from the country prior to
conducting the search. Verdugo expressly mentions the presence of
Mexican government officials on the premises when the search was
110. A counterclaim would be that the search takes place in the location, such as a satel-
lite or detectaphone, and that the end result location of the search should be the most
important factor.
I11. Cha, supra note 51 (noting that the United States does not have an extradition treaty
with Russia (which is also the reason that FBI agents lured Zezev to the United Kingdom in
order to arrest and extradite him to the United States)).
112. United States v. Gorshkov, No. CROO-550C, 2001 WL 1024026 *1, *3 (W.D. Wash.
May 23, 2001).
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conducted." 3 This fact, however, is mentioned only in passing, making it
unclear precisely what legal significance we should attach to the Court's
mention of the presence of the Mexican legal authorities. Such presence
might well have been required under the Court's reasoning, for example,
because the DEA agents were physically present in Mexico. In order not
to violate the territorial integrity of Mexico, a principal to which the
Court pays ample deference, the presence-or at least the approval-of
Mexican officials may well have been necessary. In a case where the
U.S. government investigators are never actually physically present in
the targeted country, then perhaps only notification, not approval, is
necessary.
The holding in Gorshkov seems to support this interpretation. In that
case, the Russian government was asked, but it never responded." 4 Noti-
fication was given, but approval never received.' Nevertheless,
unilateral notification appeared sufficient to the court and the evidence
was admitted.
Finally, it is worth noting that while even the presence of Russian of-
ficials might not have been enough in and of itself to immunize the
action of the U.S. Government from subsequent charges of constitutional
violations,' 6 the U.S. Government can apparently try a suspect even if he
is brought to the United States in violation of his constitutional rights,
whatever they may be." 7 Thus, we can plausibly conclude that an appeal
or notice to the foreign government is required, but the approval of that
government is not essential.
Put slightly differently, the relevance of the presence or approval of
Mexican officials really relates to the question of territorial integrity. If a
remote cross-border search violates the sovereignty of the target country
under international law, then perhaps approval is necessary."8 If no U.S.
officials actually enter the foreign country or otherwise intrude into its
space, then it is not a violation of customary international law and
113. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990).
114. Gorshkov, 2001 WL 1024026, at *4 n.2.
115. Id. In fact, the Russian government subsequently opened a criminal investigation
into the conduct of the FBI agent who gained access into the Russian servers. See Ariana Eun-
jung Cha, imeline: The FBI Sets a Trap, NEWSBYTES, May 19, 2003.
116. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that U.S.
agents could not enter Mexico to physically remove a person from another sovereign territory
and bring him back to the United States, especially without cooperation from the sovereign
government). Indeed, if U.S. law enforcement agents conduct a forcible removal of a foreign
national without the consent of that foreign government, the holding of Alvarez-Machain
would apply. In such a case the U.S. government must release that foreign national because
there was no cooperation with the foreign government in which the target resided.
117. Id.
118. See supra Part III.A.
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approval of the foreign government is not necessary. Looking at our
hypothetical, applying the Verdugo standard to remote cross-border
searches requires at least notification of the foreign government through
which the remote cross-border search is being conducted. In our
hypothetical, notification will suffice.
D. Substantial and Voluntary Connections
with the United States
The Court in Verdugo considers substantial voluntary connections
with the United States to be an extremely important part of its analysis
regarding Fourth Amendment protections of foreign nationals. " 9 In our
hypothetical, it is hard to argue that the defendant possesses the requisite
substantial voluntary connections with the United States. Because the
Court does not state the exact requirements needed for a "substantial
voluntary connection" to be established, perhaps further analysis is nec-
essary. Moreover, we need to consider the notion of "substantial
voluntary connections" in light of the emerging technology that makes
both the crime and the search possible in the first place.
In that regard, one might posit a number of different kinds of possi-
ble voluntary connections. For instance, if the foreign national
maintained a website that recorded the number of hits from computers in
the United States, one might argue that this constitutes a substantial vol-
untary connection. Since there are a number of countries that regulate
the Internet, one might also argue that such regulation by the United
States, if it actually extends to the defendant in question, gives that for-
eign national defendant a connection to U.S. territory, though perhaps
not an entirely voluntary one.120
Conversely, the U.S. government would certainly argue that website
contacts, especially mere measurement of website contacts, do not create
a substantial connection with the United States. If this were the case,
then anyone could establish a connection to the United States merely by
creating an English language website. Even the most superficial action
would be deemed to create a substantial connection to the United States
and everyone would be entitled to the protections of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.
119. See supra Part II.B.3.
120. See John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 207 (1997) (comparing the Internet regulation regimes of three different coun-
tries-the United States, Germany and China-and arguing for non-regulation of the Internet).
See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
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To unravel these arguments it is important to understand why the
connection is actually required in the first place. The substantial connec-
tion doctrine arises out of the reasonable expectations justification for
Fourth Amendment protections. If the foreign national does have sub-
stantial connections with the United States, his expectations are more
likely to be deemed reasonable. A substantial and voluntary connection
with the United States entitles one to believe that one is protected by
U.S. law when undertaking dealings within the United States. Viewed
against this backdrop, it is hard to argue that the mere establishment of a
website in English, even a website that U.S. citizens and resident aliens
might visit, creates a genuine, substantial connection with the United
States such that the creator should have the full panoply of Fourth
Amendment protections attach to his activities.
A defendant might also claim that his Internet connections with U.S.
servers or his connections that necessarily travel through servers located
in the United States meets the Verdugo substantial connection standard.
The Verdugo case was, of course, much easier to analyze in this regard
because the defendant did not possess any actual connections, physical
or electrical, with the United States. He did not even have any "societal
obligations" or any other connections with the United States.'
2'
But, under the Court's reasoning, one could argue that owning a
company that does business within the United States, or actually offering
services or items to U.S. citizens (such as a Internet security consulting
service or software sales company) would be enough to constitute "sub-
stantial voluntary connections" under the Verdugo standard. One might
even argue that living for a short time in the United States would create a
substantial connection to the United States.' 22 We know that absolutely
no connection with the United States is not substantial voluntary connec-
tions. We know that residency within the United States does create such
connections. Moreover, we strongly suspect that significant business ac-
tivity in the United States will create the requisite connections. But the
gradations in between these extremes are infinite; precisely where to
draw the line is still undetermined.
Nevertheless, we can speculate a bit about where the line might be
drawn when courts finally decide to draw such a line. Whether Verdugo-
required connections can be established through travel in the United
States, possessing gainful employment in the country, or even by taking
121. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990).
122. The court does not hold on this question. "The extent to which respondent might
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment if the duration of his stay in the United States
were to be prolonged. .. we need not decide." Id. at 271-72.
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on certain societal obligations in the United States (such as custody of a
child living in the United States), is not established by the Court. But, in
light of the events of September I I" and the passage of tighter controls
on immigration, visa entitlements and alien status, it is unlikely that the
Court would broaden the methods of establishing "voluntary substantial
connections" as a Verdugo factor.1
3
Conversely, Ivanov and Gorshkov traveled to the United States for
(what they thought was) a business deal and were trying to get jobs from
a U.S. company (albeit an FBI-created front). 11 One could argue that
Zezev was trying to establish a business relationship with Michael
Bloomberg (and possibly an employment relationship with the
Bloomberg Company). 25 Both of these defendants (and the ones in our
hypothetical case) would argue that they established the required con-
nections. These arguments seem tenuous at best, because a mere
business relationship is not addressed by the Court in Verdugo and can
be argued to be a weak link to the United States that does not exhibit a
substantial voluntary connection. Concurrently, however, such arguments
show that this Verdugo standard requires clarification.
It is likely that the Verdugo court did not create factors to govern
how one establishes these connections because foreign nationals would
always go through the motions to establish such connections before
committing cybercrimes in the United States. 26 It remains clear that fur-
ther elaboration of this important Verdugo factor is necessary for it to
function as the standard that governs the rights of foreign nationals dur-
ing remote cross-border searches of the Internet.
E. Concerns About the Court Hindering the
Activities of the Executive Branch
An integral part of the Verdugo standard is the focus on how an ad-
verse holding would affect the ability of the Executive Branch to conduct
important activities protecting the national interest.'2 7 These same con-
cerns arise when one discusses the ability of the Executive Branch and
armed forces to retaliate for attacks on our national computer infrastruc-
123. See USA Patriot Act of 2001, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (act enhancing domestic security
against terrorism, including provisions on surveillance of terrorist, money laundering, and
investigation of terrorism).
124. Russian National Indicted, supra note 49.
125. See U.S. Convicts Kazakhstan Hacker, supra note 7.
126. If the Court had determined the exact factors for establishing substantial voluntary
connections to the United States, then many future criminals would create those connections
so that Verdugo did not apply to their case. Such avoidance would significantly impair the
prosecution of international cybercrime in the United States.
127. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-74 (1990).
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ture.12 The Verdugo Court worried that a Fourth Amendment require-
ment would hinder the "ability of the political branches of the United
States to respond to foreign situations involving our national interests.' 29
The existence of coordinated attacks on U.S. computer networks by for-
eign entities would be extraordinarily serious and one would certainly
want the political branches to be able to respond adequately and effec-
tively to such an attack. Such a concern should be pertinent to the
application of the Verdugo standard. 30
The Executive Branch is charged with protecting the territorial sov-
ereignty (as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) and
therefore also charged with ensuring the well-being of the United States
and its citizens. 3' Computer attacks on government and private infra-
structure would certainly constitute attacks on U.S. territory. 2If the
Court were to decide that all remote cross-border searches by the federal
government are limited by the Verdugo standard, then the Executive
Branch could less easily perform its duties with respect to these kinds of
foreign activities.
One can argue that the underpinnings of these political outcomes are
justified on three separate grounds. First, the Supreme Court articulated
a general reluctance to impose conditions on law enforcement officials
when it is not clear that constitutional rights are being violated.
13
1
128. See, e.g., Richard W Aldrich, How Do You Know You Are at War in the Information
Age, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 223 (2000); Richard Clarke, Threats to U.S. National Security:
Proposed Partnership Initiatives Towards Preventing Cyber Terrorist Attacks, 12 DEPAUL
Bus. L.J. 33 (1999/2000); Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infra-
structure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207 (2002);
Schmitt, supra note 19; James P. Terry, Responding to Attacks on Critical Computer Infra-
structure: What Targets? What Rules of Engagement?, 46 NAVAL L. REV. 170 (1999) (all
discussing whether Article 51 of the United Nations Charter permits self-defense through
computer networks once a sovereign country has conducted an attack through that computer
network).
129. 494 U.S. at 273-74.
130. Schmitt, supra note 19, at 888 ("[T]he extraordinary advances made possible by
breakthroughs in computer technology represent dangerous vulnerabilities exploitable by oppo-
nents ranging from economic, political, and military competitors, to terrorists and
criminals.") (emphasis added). See also THE WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE THREATS AND
VULNERABILITIES 5-12 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipo/case for
action.pdf (describing the dependency of U.S. computer networks and the potential threats and
vulnerabilities) (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
131. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2.
132. Eric Jensen recognizes the right of self-defense against computer network attacks,
which is a partial step towards recognition of that right under customary international law.
Jensen, supra note 128, at 239 ("The United States and other nations should develop robust
passive and active CND [Computer Network Defense] programs and use them in response to
any CNA [Computer Network Attacks] against critical national infrastructure.").
133. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 267-68 (1990).
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Second, law enforcement (and other Executive Branch) officials need
some flexibility in their activities as technology continues to change and
advance. Without such flexibility, courts might unduly hamper the ability
of law enforcement officials to carry out legal searches using new
technology. Third, as technology advances and borders become both
more porous and less relevant as protective barriers, there is a heightened
concern regarding crime committed by foreign nationals.' 4 Accordingly,
courts are generally unwilling to unduly hamper law enforcement
activities targeted against technologically advanced crimes originating
from foreign countries against the United States.
The criminal activity in this Comment's hypothetical undoubtedly
raises all three of these concerns. The Internet is still a relatively new
medium with great potential for criminal activity. Government officials
are also rightly concerned about the vulnerability of U.S. computer net-
works to outside attacks.' 35 In our hypothetical, a court would almost
certainly be wary of unduly hampering law enforcement activities that
are targeted against Internet crime, even if-indeed, especially if-the
Internet itself is the tool the law enforcement officials use to ferret out
that crime.
IV. TOWARDS A CLEAR VERDUGO STANDARD FOR
REMOTE CROSS-BORDER SEARCHES
Since Verdugo still stands as good law on the question of how to
analyze the protections of the Fourth Amendment for foreign nationals,
it should also apply to remote cross-border Internet searches of foreign
nationals. As this Comment has demonstrated, moreover, the holding and
reasoning of Verdugo should be applied to each remote cross-border
search that is conducted by the U.S. government and law enforcement
entities on a case-by-case basis. It is clear, however, that simply applying
Verdugo to remote cross-border searches may not answer all the relevant
questions adequately. We must look to the courts for elaboration before
law enforcement officials can be assured in the legality of their activities.
This Part of the Comment discusses what additional elaboration is
needed and what an appropriate standard for remote cross-border
searches might look like.
134. This is evidenced by the fact that the U.S. government is establishing a new cyber-
security center. Dennis Fisher & Caron Carlson, Feds to Open Cyber-Security Ops Center,
EWEEK, May 26, 2003, at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,3959,1109041,00.asp (last visited
Nov. 13, 2003).
135. Id.
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A. Should There Be a Clear Verdugo Standard?
If the threshold question of Verdugo depends solely on the national-
ity of the defendant and the fact that a search occurs outside the physical
jurisdiction of the United States, then there would be no need for clarifi-
cation of the Verdugo standard. This standard would act like a strict
liability standard in torts, making it easy for law enforcement officials
and the courts to determine whether a particular defendant was entitled
to the full protection of the Fourth Amendment.
As this Comment demonstrates, matters are not that simple. The
Court rightly identified a number of factors essential to the determina-
tion of the legality of a remote cross-border search. The application of
these factors is greatly complicated, however, by the kind of technology
now available to law enforcement officials to conduct such searches. The
tremendously varied circumstances of potential defendants also make
rigid application of bright line tests both difficult and ill-advised.
For instance, a search might be routed through servers in a number
of different countries, ultimately ending up with the target server actu-
ally housed somewhere in the United States. The foreign cybercriminal
might have substantial ties to the United States, either through business
connections, family connections, or numerous years spent in the United
States under some sort of legal capacity. Certain substantial voluntary
connections might be established if the defendant had previously paid
taxes or incurred some "societal obligation," as the Verdugo Court
held.
36
Each of these variables relates to the factors articulated by the
Verdugo Court, and application of some or all of these variables against
the Verdugo standard would be ill-advised or impossible.
B. Clarifying and Constructing the Verdugo Standard
We find a good beginning to the creation of appropriate standards in
the very facts surrounding the cybercrime itself. First, the defendant's
factual circumstances should be examined and understood, including the
nationality of the defendant. This also encompasses such determinations
as whether the defendant is a foreign national or resident alien, what
type of connections the defendant possesses with the United States (in-
cluding both the nature and extent of such connections), and, finally, the
type of criminal activity of which the defendant has been accused.
These factual variables not only inform the reasonableness of the de-
fendant's expectations of privacy, but they also help determine where the
136. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 273.
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presumptions lie. For example, the Verdugo holding states that, generally
speaking, foreign nationals do not possess Fourth Amendment rights and
expectations similar to U.S. citizens and resident aliens.'37 From this, one
might well conclude that foreign nationals generally should not receive
Fourth Amendment protections unless they can demonstrate some spe-
cial reason for why they should receive them. The standard could be that
once the government proves that a defendant is a foreign national, then
the Fourth Amendment would not apply to government searches of that
defendant's property conducted abroad unless the defendant can show
reasons why he or she should receive Fourth Amendment protections. 138
Defendants could then, in turn, show that they possess substantial volun-
tary connections with the United States or that the U.S. officials actually
intruded physically upon the soil of the foreign country when they con-
ducted the search.
A second set of variables must revolve around the search itself. One
question to ask, for example, is whether or not the search was truly con-
ducted outside the territory of the United States. The Court would
investigate the location of the target data, the methods that the govern-
ment used to intercept or download that data, and the availability of that
data within computers located in the physical confines of the United
States. If the data is physically located on a computer server outside of
the United States, such a factor counsels toward applying the Verdugo
standard and denying Fourth Amendment protection to the defendant. If,
on the other hand, the data crossed through servers located in a number
of different territories, but ultimately ended up back in a computer server
housed within the territory of the United States, then the search might
appropriately be viewed as a search within the territory of the United
States.
In addition, the Court would have to look at the accessibility factors
of the target server. Easy accessibility of the computer server within the
United States, such as an offshore storage web server designed to service
only U.S. customers, would be a factor that cuts against the search being
treated as a cross-border search under the Verdugo standard. 3 9
137. Id. at 261.
138. Of course, Justice Brennan disagrees with this analysis, stating that "[w]hen our
Government conducts a law enforcement search against a foreign national outside of the
United States and its territories, it must comply with the Fourth Amendment.... When we tell
the world that we expect all people, wherever they may be, to abide by our laws, we cannot in
the same breath tell the world that our law enforcement officers need not do the same." 494
U.S. at 296-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. Factors that might cut in favor of this argument would be that the web-based stor-
age facility is marketed to U.S. customers, built for U.S. customers, and that U.S. customers
believe the server is actually within U.S. territory, even though it is not. In such a case, there
Boundaries of Fourth Amendment Rights
The overall presumption should be that the Verdugo standard applies
to remote cross-border searches of foreign nationals unless the presump-
tion could be rebutted. The defendant could rebut such a presumption
through proof of his or her special circumstances or through evidence
that the search actually culminated in securing data that was physically
(and perhaps exclusively) present in, and only in, a server located within
the United States. Each one of the Verdugo factors would be used to ana-
lyze a remote cross-border search, and each factor would carry equal
weight in the summation of whether the Fourth Amendment would apply
in such a circumstance. As long as the majority of these factors of the
Verdugo standard weighed towards not requiring Fourth Amendment
protections, then the case would be analyzed under this standard and no
warrant would be required. However, if the majority of the factors were
dissimilar from Verdugo, then the standard would not be applied, and a
warrant would be required for the remote cross-border search conducted
by law enforcement entities or the U.S. government.
C. Interpreting the Clarified Verdugo Standard
So, what precisely needs to be clarified for Verdugo to apply to re-
mote cross-border searches? To date, the Court has placed the most
emphasis on the fact that the search occurred outside U.S. territory. Ac-
cordingly, the area ripest for exposition relates to the definition of the
location of a search in light of computer technology and the Internet.
Second, in terms of connections to the United States, the Court ulti-
mately needs to give content to both the ideas of "substantial" and
"voluntary." All of these concepts need to be clarified, moreover, against
the backdrop of the important foreign policy concerns that underlie the
doctrine in the first place. Finally, even as it clarifies the Verdugo stan-
dard, the Court must be attentive to the need for flexibility in its
application and its subsequent doctrinal development.
Indeed, as computers and technology continue to become more ad-
vanced and the territorial boundaries through the Internet continue to
diminish, it becomes especially important for the Court to create a more
explanatory standard of how Verdugo should apply to cybercrime. With-
out a clear standard or guidance from the courts, federal prosecutors will
find it more difficult to conduct remote cross-border searches in the in-
stances they are needed. This is especially important for computer
crimes and Internet-based searches, because evidence can be destroyed,
transferred or removed almost instantaneously in some cases. Thus, in
might be arguments that searches conducted into such servers are searches within U.S. terri-
tory because citizens and aliens alike have a reasonable belief that the server space is located
within U.S. territory.
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order not to hinder the federal government as it combats cybercrime and
protects U.S. territory and U.S. citizens and residents, the Court should
clarify the existing Verdugo standard so that prosecutors and law en-
forcement officials can understand precisely when a remote cross-border
search must comply with the Fourth Amendment and when it need not.
CONCLUSION
Cybercrime and cyberterrorism are topics increasingly in the fore-
front of international criminal law and political regulatory discussions.
As technology continues to advance and the numbers of Internet users
continues to increase, the commission of crimes affecting the U.S. gov-
ernment, U.S. companies and U.S. residents undoubtedly will grow.
Whether the federal government will be required to extend Fourth
Amendment protections to foreign nationals engaged in cybercrimes is
an issue potentially solved by the application of a clear Verdugo standard
and through using this standard to analyze each remote cross-border
search under the four factors stated in the Verdugo decision. Since no
court has yet to completely analyze such a search under the factors stated
in Verdugo, it is important to develop the doctrine of Fourth Amendment
rights that apply against foreign nationals accused of committing crimes
over the Internet, especially as the methods and techniques of crimes and
searches become more technologically advanced and intricate.
Applying the current Verdugo-style reasoning to remote cross-border
searches will not necessarily result in a clear standard, however, and
more clarity is needed. Such clarity must be achieved without sacrificing
the capacity of the law to change with changing technology. Technologi-
cal advances must be met with responsive legal advances. The
application of such a clear standard is essential to U.S. law enforcement
personnel in their efforts to protect citizens and residents of the United
States from criminals who can now strike from literally anywhere in the
world.
